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THE FAA v. THE NTSB: NOW THAT CONGRESS
HAS ADDRESSED THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION'S "DUAL MANDATE," HAS THE FAA
BEGUN LIVING UP TO ITS AMENDED PURPOSE OF
MAKING AIR TRAVEL SAFER, OR IS THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
STILL DOING ITS JOB ALONE?
LEA ANN CARLISLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
A FTER THE MAY 1996 crash of Valujet Flight 592 in the
Florida Everglades, a media frenzy took place scrutiniz-
ing and criticizing the Federal Aviation Administration for the
possible part it played in the disaster. The Secretary of Trans-
portation, Frederico Pena, eventually called for Congress to re-
examine the FAA's "dual mandate," a provision in the Federal
Aviation Act of the 1950s, which gave the FAA the purpose of
promoting civil aviation while regulating safety issues. These
conflicting purposes are an obvious problem once one realizes
that for every proposed safety regulation, the FAA must weigh
the cost of implementation and determine if it is worth the fi-
nancial strain on the airlines. More often than not, the FAA
decided the change was not worth the financial cost, even with
the NTSB's strong recommendation and support for the new
regulation, until a major air disaster forced it to declare
otherwise.
Congress amended the Act in October 1996, removing the
language "promoting" aviation and adding in several provisions
emphasizing safety. The question is, has the FAA changed its
ways? This comment will explore the history of the FAA, includ-
ing how it came to emphasize market growth and finances over
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the public's safety; the impact of major air disasters in the late
1990s including Valujet Flight 592, TWA Flight 800, and Ameri-
can Airlines Flight 1420 in Little Rock - a so-called "survivable
crash" that still claimed the lives of nine people; and the FAA's
stance on safety regulations and time-table for recommending
new safety changes since the supposed elimination of the "dual
mandate" three years ago.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FAA
A. CREATING THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
The FAA came into existence more than fifty years after the
Wright brothers first launched their airplane in 1903 in Kitty
Hawk, North Carolina.' By 1909, they had a contract with the
military, and the advent of World War I boosted the industry as
the military made vast improvements in aircraft design and the
fighter ace was born. 2 Although there was just one U.S. airplane
manufacturer at this early stage, the aviation industry continued
to grow quickly, and in 1914, the first commercial flight featur-
ing a paying passenger occurred between Tampa and St. Peters-
burg, Florida. 3
The 1920s saw huge industry growth in Europe as the conti-
nent rebuilt after the war, and the first airmail routes sprang up
in the States.4 The first industry accident involving scheduled
flights also occurred when two airplanes collided in midair while
following the same road to their destinations, in opposite
directions. 5
In 1926, the Air Commerce Act was passed in response to in-
dustry demands for regulation and safety concerns.6 By decree-
ing that the Post Office could hire private flyers to deliver the
mail, it played a major part in developing the companies still
involved in the aviation industry today.7 For instance, the Chi-
cago-to-Oakland mail run was awarded to a lumber supplier
named William Boeing, who began to build his own planes to fly
the route.8
I See MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND, FLYING SAFE 45 (1998).




6 See ScHIAvo, supra note 1, at 46.




The most important characteristic of the Air Commerce Act
"was its commitment to promote the development and stability
of commercial aviation."9 It gave the Secretary of Commerce
the duty "to encourage air commerce by attracting capital, creat-
ing appropriate laws, and establishing civil airways and naviga-
tional facilities."'" It was this which set the stage for the FAA's
commitment to promote commerce rather than safety.1
With such promotion and growth of the aviation industry, reg-
ulations were badly needed. Initially, the Post Office inspected
planes and set up training programs for pilots.' 2 As accidents
and crashes increased, the airlines tried different tactics to reas-
sure consumers, such as promising that each flight attendant
was a nurse.13 Various states began passing a myriad of laws
specifying safety requirements, but no federal safety program
was established until the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, strongly ad-
vocated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which created the
Federal Aviation Administration. 14
Yet, the 1958 Act continued to focus on promoting the indus-
try, putting safety second. Under Title 1 of the Act, entitled
"General Provisions," section 103 contained a "Declaration of
Policy" for the FAA's Administrator that:
In the exercise and performance of his powers and duties under
this Act, the Administrator shall consider the following, among
other things, as being in the public interest:
(a) The regulation of air commerce in such manner as to best
promote its development and safety and fulfill the require-
ments of national defense;
(b) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics;
(c) The control of the use of navigable airspace of the United
States and the regulation of both civil and military opera-
tions in such airspace in the interest of the safety and effi-
ciency of both;
(d) The consolidation of research and development with respect




11 See SCHIAVO, supra note 1, at 47.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id. at 47-48.
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(e) The development 'and operation of a common system of air
traffic control and navigation for both military and civil
aircraft.
15
Industry promotion held just as prominent a position, if not
more so, than safety in this statute. Title III of the Act created
the Federal Aviation Administration, and section 305, entitled
"Fostering of Air Commerce," directed the Administrator "to en-
courage and foster the development of civil aeronautics and air
commerce in the United States and abroad. 1 6 No special sec-
tion existed stating that safety was a primary concern beyond
just the general defense of the nation.17
The 1994 version of this Act is similar, though safety concerns
may be a bit more prominent almost forty years later. A look at
various parts of 49 U.S.C. § 40101 shows that the problem of
the dual mandate might have been addressed at least two full
years before the 1996 Valujet tragedy, yet the clash between
safety and commerce still existed.
(a) Economic Regulation - In carrying out Subpart II .. . the
Secretary of Transportation shall consider the following mat-
ters, among others, as being in the public interest and consis-
tent with public convenience and necessity:
(1) assigning and maintaining safety as the highest priority
in air commerce.
(2) before authorizing new air transportation services, evalu-
ating the safety implications of those services.
(3) preventing deterioration in established safety proce-
dures, recognizing the clear intent, encouragement, and
dedication of Congress to further the highest degree of
safety in air transportation and air commerce, and to
maintain the safety vigilance that has evolved in air
transportation and air commerce and has come to be
expected by the traveling and shipping public.
(4) the availability of a variety of adequate, economic, effi-
cient, and low-priced services without unreasonable dis-
crimination or unfair or deceptive practices.1 8
(c) General Safety Considerations - In carrying out subpart III
... the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall consider the following matters:
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 76 Stat. 731 (1958), 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 855, 866.
16 Id. at 876.
17 See id. at 876-7.
18 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a) (1994).
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(1) the requirements of national defense and commercial
and general aviation.
(2) the public right of freedom of transit through the navi-
gable airspace.
(d) Safety Considerations in Public Interest - In carrying out
subpart III... the Administrator shall consider the following
matters, among others, as being in the public interest:
(1) regulating air commerce in a way that best promotes its
development and safety and fulfills national defense
requirements.
(2) encouraging, and developing civil aeronautics .... 19
Thus, it is clear what Congress held as important-commerce,
and so the FAA was created with this as its primary focus, regu-
lating an industry without really moving beyond the role of ac-
countant and advisor except when absolutely necessary and
when public outcry demanded it.
B. THE FAA's ACTIONS REGARDING PUBLIC SAFETY ON AIRCRAFT
UNDER THE "DUAL MANDATE."
In 1995, U.S. News and World Report examined the FAA's ac-
tions regarding safety issues, focusing on four areas in particu-
lar: "certification of new airplanes and trouble-shooting in
planes already flying, pilot fatigue, use of unapproved parts to
repair airliners, and FAA safety inspections."2 The study found
that when considering implementing safety regulations, the FAA
sided with the airline's position that new provisions were unnec-
essary or too costly more often than finding that the cost was
worth saving the lives of the traveling public. 2 ' According to for-
mer FAA top security official Billie Vincent, "The industry...
really own [s] the FAA."'2 2
What evidence supports such an allegation, hinging on the
implied corruption of an important government agency? Take
a look at the FAA's history of implementing safety regulations
only after repeated incidents and deaths - earning it the nick-
name the "tombstone agency." 23 Part of the problem, besides
the "dual mandate," is the lack of power given to the National
19 Id. § 40101 (c)-(d) (2).
20 Stephen J. Hedges et al., What's Wrong with the FAA: the FAA Is Supposed to
Police Commercial Aviation, But the Agency Still Refuses To Act Like a Tough Cop on the
Beat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 26, 1995, at 28.
21 See id.
22 Id.
23 Steve Liewer, Death in a Survivable Crash: Many Planes Are Still 'Lethal Environ-
ments,' FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, June 6, 1999, at 1G.
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Transportation Safety Board. The NTSB's job is to investigate
air disasters and inform the FAA of any recommendations,
which may aid in preventing a repeat disaster. 24 The FAA must
implement the changes, however, as the NTSB has no statutory
authority to enforce its own recommendations. 25 Thus, the
weight of rejected safety measures, which, if implemented
sooner, could have saved lives or prevented air disasters, lies
solely with the FAA. 26
The FAA is required to consider the cost to the airline indus-
try of any regulations implemented, 27 but do they too often ig-
nore the cost of human life to save a few bucks? "In rejecting
NTSB recommendations, the FAA has repeatedly weighted eco-
nomics over safety concerns. '' 2 An example is the issue of
smoke detectors. In 1975, the NTSB recommended that smoke
detectors be installed in airplane lavatories, but the FAA failed
to act.21 In 1984, an Air Canada jet had a fire break out in a
lavatory over Kentucky, causing the deaths of twenty-three pas-
sengers. As a result, the FAA finally required the detectors on
all planes.3 0 The NTSB made a similar suggestion in 1988 in-
volving the installation of smoke detectors in older planes, such
as the Valujet DC-9, which crashed in the Florida Everglades."
The FAA felt that the costs would outweigh the benefits and
failed to implement the recommendation that may have, in fact,
saved the Valujet aircraft and passengers. 2
Other examples of FAA inaction include de-icing measures
and the installation of radar and improved lighting on runways.
De-icing aircraft can occur in two ways: on the ground before
the plane takes off and in the air, usually in preparation for
landing. Ground de-icing involves applying liquids containing
chemicals like glycols and tolyltriazoles, which bind to metal,
thereby clinging to an aircraft and preventing a buildup of ice
and snow.3 De-icing fluids also may be applied in flight to the




27 See Liewer, supra note 23.









wings of an aircraft to dissolve ice buildup so that wing flaps can
be extended. The FAA refused to require stricter de-icing mea-
sures until public pressure forced the issue after a USAir jet
crashed at LaGuardia in 1992, killing twenty-seven passengers.34
Even in 1998, Chairman James Hall of the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board called the FAA's response to icing incidents
"disappointing."35
Although the NTSB made the recommendation in 1985, the
FAA only addressed the implementation of radar and special
lighting on runways after forty-six people died in two crashes,
one involving the collision of two Northwest planes in Detroit in
1990, and the other involving a USAir jet which landed on a
commuter plane in Los Angeles.36
In each of these incidents, the problem has been addressed,
but only after the unnecessary loss of life most probably due to
delayed implementation. Other NTSB recommendations have
yet to be addressed by the FAA. An example is the delay in re-
quiring updated "black box" recorders on aging Boeing 737s.7
Two serious crashes involving 737s, which had mysteriously
rolled upside down, occurred in both 1992 and 1994.3 Because
of the limited data available, the cause of neither crash has been
identified, and investigators may have to wait for another tragic
accident involving a 737 with an updated black box to learn how
to prevent future accidents. 9
Although the FAA has addressed particular issues in these
areas, other issues still remain. Further problems have contin-
ued involving de-icing. An NTSB report on the crash of a
Comair flight from Covington, Kentucky to Detroit in January
1997 stated as the cause of the accident:
the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to establish ade-
quate aircraft certification standards for flight in icing condi-
tions, the FAA's failure to ensure that a Centro Tecnico
Aerospacial/FAA-approved procedure for the accident airplane's
de-ice system operation was implemented by U.S.-based carriers,
34 See Sam Gresock, Clearing Ice from Aircraft Calls for Chemical, Analytical Solu-
tions, TRIB. REv.,June 15, 1997, at H1; Paul Proctor, New Technology Plays Key Role
in De-icing Gear, AViATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1995, at 40.
35 Enhanced Scrutiny of Process Seen As Key To Improved Safety, AIR SAErir' WK.,
Sept. 28, 1998.
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and the FAA's failure to require the establishment of adequate
minimum airspeeds for icing conditions, which led to the loss of
control when the airplane accumulated a thin, rough accretion
of ice on its lifting surfaces."°
The NTSB concluded that the plane, an Empresa Brasileira
de Aeronautica (EMB-120) ,41 had most likely been clear of ice
until it reached an altitude of 4000 feet when it began to pass
through clouds of precipitation, allowing ice to form over the
plane.42 In addition, the pilots had completed the descent
checklist, including de-icing the propeller and activating the
windshield heat, before reaching this altitude. 3 The plane's
flight performance demonstrated problems in both lift and drag
during the descent to 4000 feet, "consistent with a combination
of thin, rough ice accumulation on the impingement (including
both upper and lower wing leading edge surfaces), with possible
ice ridge accumulation." 44 Icing research tunnel tests con-
ducted by NASA, known as IRT tests, showed that when an EMB-
120 wing is exposed to weather conditions similar to those ex-
perienced by the Comair flight, the wing developed small ice
ridges along the de-icing boot tube segment seamlines. 45
NASA's computational studies found that these ice strips acted
as "stall strips, creating more disrupted airflow over the airfoil's
upper surface, further decreasing the lift produced by the
airfoil, and resulting in a lower stall AOA [angle of attack] than
the rough ice accretions alone."46 The NTSB concluded that
the Comair flight gradually gathered a thin layer of rough ice on
the front edge of the de-icing boot surfaces, and that this ice
may have been imperceptible to the pilots. 47
For many years airplane manufacturers have placed de-icing
boots, which cause ice that forms on the protected surfaces of
the airframe to fall away, along the front edge of aircraft wings
40 Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation A-98-88 through -106, at 1
(quoting Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., In-flight Icing Encounter.. ., AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT
REPORT NTSB/ AAR-98/04 (1998)).
41 See id.
42 See id. at 3.
43 See id. at 2.
44 Id. at 7.
45 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation A-98-88 through -106, at 1
(quoting In-Flight Icing Encounter..., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/ AAR-98/
04 (1998)).




that are to be certified to fly in icy conditions.4" De-icing boots
have historically kept the leading edge of an aircraft's wings and
tail free from ice as long as they are operated properly.4 9 How-
ever, when prematurely activated, they might cause ice forma-
tion in the shape of an inflated de-icing boot, and cause "ice
bridging," which makes de-icing of the plane's surface during
flight impossible. 50 This is what occurred during the flight of
the crashed Comair plane.
The NTSB determined that if the FAA had required the air-
plane manufacturers to conduct tests with a small amount of ice
on the de-icing boots during ice certification testing, they might
have uncovered the lack of an adequate safety margin between
the performance speed and the stall speed of the aircraft1.5 The
NTSB had made recommendations to the FAA in 1994 regard-
ing changes to icing certification testing, which were not really
addressed, although the FAA had implemented a three-phase
plan, which could satisfy the need for the changes.52
The FAA has also refused to address design flaws in aircraft.
For instance, the MD-il wide-body had a problem with the flaps
that expand from the front of the wings during takeoff and
landing, known as "slats. '53 When a lever was accidentally hit
during flight deploying the "slats," the plane began making wild
pitching motions, and two passengers were killed in the result-
ing accident.5 4 After eleven other incidents, the FAA finally re-
quired the problem to be permanently fixed.55
Another possible design problem involved Boeing's new 777.
Under protest by FAA engineers, senior officials declined to re-
quire Boeing to perform tests of the 777's thrust reversers and
allowed Boeing to simply submit data collected during earlier
tests.56 In addition, the FAA certified the plane only a few days
48 See id. at 8.
49 See id.
50 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation A-98-88 through -106, at 1
(quoting In-Flight IcingEncounter.... AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/ AAR-98/
04, 8-9 (1998)).
51 See id. at 27.
52 See id. at 28. According to FAA personnel, this plan would not result in new
rules until January 2000, six years after the recommendations were made, three
years after the Comair crash.
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after engineers resolved concerns about the possibility of severe
vibrations in the plane's massive engines.57
In both cases investigated in 1995 by U.S. News, the FAA dis-
missed concerns by saying that the planes met regulations."
Both Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas also claimed that the
planes were safe and met FAA regulations.59 There is a real
problem here. If companies can simply claim that they meet the
FAA's regulations when there is a questionable event involving
plane design, that is one thing. But for the FAA to also claim
compliance with regulations as an excuse for not requiring what
seems to be a reasonable test or design change, implies there
are both serious problems with the regulations (perhaps they
need to be updated in the face of new technology) and with the
agency's motives and responsibilities regarding the safety of new
aircraft.
Part of the FAA's lack of enthusiasm for adopting new safety
regulations may be the fault of the tort system. 60 The Federal
Tort Claims Act states that the United States is liable for any:
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 6
However, Congress provided a safety feature, a discretionary-
function exemption for the FAA,62 for any government agency
regarding:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat-
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.6"
This means that adopting new safety regulations can be done
at the FAA's discretion without threat of liability from accidents
that could have been prevented had a safety regulation been
57 See id.
58 See Hedges et al., supra note 20.
59 See id.
60 See Pounian, supra note 24.
61 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
62 See Pounian, supra note 24.
63 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
750
DUAL MANDATE
adopted and implemented in a timely fashion.64 Obviously, if
the FAA had the threat of liability for such accidents, it would
have a great incentive for taking quick action, rather than wait-
ing for the bodies to stack up.
Unfortunately for the general public, this is not the case. In
fact, in 1984, in the case of United States v. Varig Airlines,65 the
Supreme Court issued a ruling that exempted the FAA from
suits involving the duty to inspect. In Varig, fire broke out in the
lavatory of a Boeing 707 on its way to Paris from Rio de Janeiro.
Although the plane landed safely, most of the passengers died
from asphyxiation on thick, black smoke or toxic gases pro-
duced by the fire, and most of the fuselage was destroyed. While
the FAA had imposed safety regulations regarding aircraft de-
sign and maintenance, it had placed the burden for compliance
with the regulations on the manufacturers, and retained only
the duty to conduct spot-checks on the manufacturers to see if
they were complying. 66
The Court stated:
It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor,
that governs whether the discretionary function exception ap-
plies in a given case. Moreover, the legislative history discloses
that such exception was plainly intended to encompass the dis-
cretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator
of the conduct of private individuals.6" . . . When an agency de-
termines the safety procedures of private individuals, it is exercis-
ing discretionary regulatory authority of the most basic kind."
The Court also extended the exception to the FAA inspectors, as
they were "specifically empowered to make policy judgments re-
garding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be
placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compli-
ance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency
resources."69 The Court reasoned that although they took risks
in making these decisions, the risks were taken in order to ad-
- See Pounian, supra note 24.
65 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
66 See McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
from Varig a case where the government placed safety inspectors in a plant on a
permanent basis and finding liability for the government under the FTCA).
67 Varig, 467 U.S. at 798 (quoting the FTCA).
- Id. at 819-820.
6 Id. at 820.
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vance FAA purposes and were specifically authorized in the reg-
ulations, therefore falling into the discretionary exception. 0
Just consider for a moment that if a government agency can
make discretionary decisions about public safety and avoid liabil-
ity when those decisions are bad and cost lives, what keeps the
government agency doing its best to make good decisions? Abso-
lutely nothing. In Vaig, the FAA could determine when to
make spot-checks and how many to make each year. The in-
spectors had no duty to look at every plane, or even to look at
more than one plane. Because the inspection schedule was not
specified, the government was not liable when this program
failed, a plane burned, and killed most of the people on board.
The court talks about the agency furthering its purpose, but if
its purpose is to make decisions that ensure, or at least attempt
to ensure the safety of the public, why should it not be held
responsible for those decisions when they are bad? How can we
make the FAA inspect more planes, more often, when we cannot
do anything if it does not? Obviously, in order to have a real
remedy, no safety inspection or enforcement program should
be left to the whim of the FAA, or any agency. A system of
checks and balances is necessary to ensure that the job gets
done, and safety programs need to be specified so that when
they fail or are improperly conducted, the blame can be placed
on the proper parties.
C. REMOVAL OF THE "DUAL MANDATE."
In 1994, 259 people died in six crashes. The NTSB allocat4'd
some of the blame for five of the tragedies to the FAA's inaction
or lack of enforcement.71 As mentioned before, the Valujet
tragedy might be placed in this category.
Before the 1996 crash, Valujet appeared to be a great success
story. Founded in 1993, it had grown from two planes on eight
routes to fifty-one planes with 320 routes in just a few years.72
Yet, Valujet seemed to be troubled by its wild growth. In 1995,
Valujet bid for a Department of Defense (DoD) contract to
transport DoD personnel.73 DoD investigators found problems
with almost every aspect of Valujet, from management to inspec-
tions to records and documentation, and filed a condemning
70 See id.
71 See Hedges, supra note 20.
72 See SCHIAVO, supra note 1, at 7.
73 See id. at 11.
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report of Valujet: "'The company does not yet meet the DoD
Commercial Air Quality and Safety Requirements.' "7' Essen-
tially, Valujet was not good enough to shuttle government em-
ployees, but could freely transport the unsuspecting public.75
Perhaps if Valujet had been tightly regulated, its growth
would not have spiraled out of control. In 1994, Valujet made
fifteen emergency landings, a statistic which increased to fifty-
seven in 1995. These emergencies were directly proportionate
to its growth.76 Before the Everglades tragedy in 1996, Valujet
had already made fifty-nine emergency landings-in fact,
"[flrom February through May of 1996, Valujet would have an
unscheduled landing almost every other day."77
Other problems with Valujet included planes over-shooting
runways, landing gear mishaps, an engine explosion that injured
seven people with shrapnel and an ensuing fire, a plane put
back into service with damaged engine housing, an emergency
chute that inflated inside the cabin, a shorted-out microphone
preventing the pilot from communicating with Air-Traffic Con-
trol, sudden depressurization of a cabin in flight, and the use of
duct tape to fix problem spots on planes. 78 Particularly dis-
turbing was the story about a mechanic who used a hammer and
chisel to fix a delicate engine part, and later that same engine
had to be shut down in flight.79 Valujet pilots took off in
weather that would ground other flights,80 probably because of
the company policy that prevented pilots from getting paid un-
less they finished a flight.8 Some planes had chronic mainte-
nance issues, such as a used DC-9 that suffered a string of
serious problems, including: "a malfunctioning fuel anti-ice
valve, faulty gears, a loose oil cap causing a drop in oil pressure,
smoke and fumes seeping into the cabin during taxiing, loss of
pressure during an emergency landing, landing gear that




76 See id. at 12.
77 ScHIAVO, supra note 1, at 12.
78 See id. at 14-15.
79 See id. at 15.
80 See id. at 14.
81 See id. at 7.
82 SCHIAVO, supra note 1, at 15.
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In February 1996, prompted by a visit from the office of the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General, the FAA
staff in Atlanta evidently wrote such a disturbing report on
Valujet, describing accidents and problems, that the memo was
buried until the Everglades disaster forced it into the public
view.83 While the memo prompted the FAA to take some action,
rather than grounding the airline, the FAA issued a warning to
Valujet and continuously denied publicly that there were any
problems.8 4 On May 11, 1996, Flight 592 crashed in the Florida
Everglades, killing all 110 on board.85 Almost ironically, the
DC-9 involved in the crash was the same plane with chronic
maintenance problems discussed above.8 6
The FAA spent weeks after the crash declaring that all airlines
were safe, and that there was nothing wrong with Valujet.87 Af-
ter the crash, the FAA began daily inspections of Valujet and
soon could no longer deny that there were serious problems
with the airline. The airline was finally shut down in part
because of "'serious deficiencies' in Valujet's maintenance." '8 8
Slowly, high-ranking FAA officials began to admit that the
agency bore some responsibility for the condition of Valujet.89
Even David Hinson, the FAA Administrator, said, "'Yes, we bear
some responsibilities in this case." 9 Valujet may be one of the
most profound examples of taking action only after it is too late.
The simple fact that Valujet had an accident rate fourteen times
that of the major airlines9 should have been enough to con-
vince someone that there was a problem before a major disaster
occured.
The NTSB figured out the cause of the crash fairly quickly.92
Two weeks after the crash, the NTSB sent the FAA a report stat-
ing "' [p] reliminary evidence indicates that five cardboard boxes
containing as many as 144 chemical oxygen generators ... had
been loaded in the forward cargo compartment shortly before
departure."' 93 The memo noted that it was a class D cargo com-
83 See id.
84 See id. at 16-17.
85 See id. at 18.
86 See id. at 20.
87 See SCHIAVO, supra note 1, at 21-2.
88 Id. at 25.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 29.




partment, which was not equipped with smoke or fire detection
equipment to alert the crew to a problem. 94 The NTSB went on
to state "'a fire should not be allowed to persist in any state of
intensity in an airplane without the knowledge of the flight
crew."' 95 Bluntly put, "'[a] fire detection system should be re-
quired in class D cargo compartments.'- 96 A later report from
the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure re-
vealed that this recommendation was "'rejected by the FAA be-
cause they believed the gain in safety would not justify the cost
of requiring all aircraft to install such systems.'97
In the wake of the media attention from the Valujet crash, the
FAA became a target of public outrage because of its apparent
priority for promoting the airline industry over safety con-
cerns.98 Finally, in the summer of 1996, Secretary of Transporta-
tion Pena asked Congress to delete the "dual mandate" from the
statute authorizing the FAA. 99 Yet, that is not exactly what
occurred.
On October 9, 1996 Congress passed Public Law 104-264, also
known as the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996,
which addressed and amended various troublesome provisions
of the statute governing the aviation industry. 10 Basically, all
this did was change the wording from "promoting" to "encour-
aging" aviation, while inserting a few safety concerns. 101
The statute now reads:
(d) Safety concerns in public interest. - In carrying out subpart
III . . ., the Administrator shall consider the following mat-
ters, among others, as being in the public interest:
(1) assigning, maintaining, and enhancing safety and secur-
ity as the highest priorities in air commerce.
(2) regulating air commerce in a way that best promotes
safety and fulfills national defense requirements.
(3) encouraging and developing civil aeronautics.
(4) controlling the use of the navigable airspace and regu-




97 ScHIAvo, supra note 1, at 26.
98 See id. at 33.
99 See id.
1oo See Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110
Stat. 3213, 3255 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101).
10l See id.
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the interest of the safety and efficiency of both of those
operations.
(5) consolidating research and development for air naviga-
tion facilities and the installation and operation of those
facilities.
(6) developing and operating a common system of air traf-
fic control and navigation for military and civil aircraft.
(7) providing assistance to law enforcement agencies in the
enforcement of laws related to regulation of controlled
substances, to the extent consistent with aviation
safety. 10 2
If it seems that Congress finally tried to do something about
the problem, note the fine print: "[We] do not intend for the
enactment of this provision to require any changes in the FAA's
current organization or functions. Instead, the provision is in-
tended to address any public perceptions.., that the promotion
of air commerce by the FAA could create a conflict with its safety
... mandate. 10 3
So now the question is, has this slight change in wording re-
ally had any effect? The FAA is still concerned with commerce,
only now they are supposed to regulate it safely. Who enforces
this change? The answer is probably the FAA itself, but they
have already shown that the agency's priorities are skewed; pos-
sibly the Inspector General; possibly Congress; possibly public
opinion; possibly no one.
A better question is, how does the NTSB fit into the picture
and why doesn't this agency have any power over the FAA?
III. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
A. Go TrAM
In 1967, the National Transportation Safety Board was formed
to pursue independent investigations of all United States civil
aviation accidents and major accidents in other transportation
areas, such as rail, highway, marine, and pipeline. 10 4 Yet, it has
no regulatory or enforcement powers and is not affiliated with
the Department of Transportation or the FAA. 105 Information
provided by the NTSB regarding its investigations cannot be
1.02 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d) (2000).
103 Mary Schiavo, Mary Schiavo's Safety Wish List, AIR SAFETY WK., May 18, 1998.
104 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., About the NTSB: The Investigative Process, at




used as evidence in a court of law; the sole purpose of this
agency is to improve transportation safety.1"6 In addition, if the
NTSB determines that criminal activity is involved in an inci-
dent, the FBI takes over the investigation, and the NTSB only
provides requested support.10 7
To investigate the 2,000 or so aviation accidents or incidents
per year, along with the approximately 500 accidents involving
other varieties of transportation, the NTSB designates parties to
operate on each investigation. 10  By law, the FAA is automati-
cally a party, and other corporations or agencies may be desig-
nated depending on their areas of expertise and according to
the NTSB's complete discretion.10 Lawyers and those who op-
erate in other legal positions are not permitted to be parties in
an investigation. °10
If an investigation is really large, such as with TWA Flight
800,111 investigative groups, consisting of specialists from the
parties, may be established.' 12 Each group is headed by a group
chairman and may look into such areas as "structures, systems,
powerplants, human performance, fire and explosion, meteorol-
ogy, radar data, flight data recorder and witness statements. ' "3
Since safety is the primary function of the Board, safety defi-
ciencies are often addressed before an investigation is complete,
and may have nothing to do with the final determination of the
cause of the crash." 4 For instance, in the case of the crash of a
DC-10 in Sioux City, Iowa in 1989, the Board issued four sepa-
rate safety recommendations before the investigation was
complete." 5
An important question to ask is, if safety is essentially the sole
purpose of the NTSB's mandate, why has this agency no en-
forcement power? Why should it issue numerous safety recom-
mendations based on investigations of actual crashes to just be




- See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., About the NTSB: The Investigative Process, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/abt-ntsb/invest.htm (Aug. 9, 1998).
110 See id.
11 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Major Investigations, at http://www.ntsb.gov/
events/major.htm (Aug. 9, 1998).
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forcement authority so that its recommendations will not be
tainted by an abuse of power, or by the financial considerations
that have made the FAA essentially impotent, or at the very best
crawling along at a snail's pace. If, however, it takes numerous
crashes to make the FAA sit up and listen to a recommendation
that the NTSB made years before, this does not seem to be an
efficient use of time or knowledge.
In each investigation, the NTSB conducts months of tests and
analyses before issuing a final report. 6 Parties to the investiga-
tion do not participate in the analysis of data or in writing the
report, but can submit their findings and safety recommenda-
tions to the Board.117 The Board then conducts deliberations
over the final report in a public meeting in Washington, D.C., in
which non-NTSB personnel are not allowed to participate." 8
B. THE NTSB's MOST WANTED
In 1990, the NTSB began issuing a list of the most wanted
transportation safety improvements, including recommenda-
tions for boating, aviation, automobiles, trains, and transporta-
tion of hazardous materials." 9 On this list for aviation were
recommendations for the prevention of airport runway incur-
sions (now number one on the list), implementing aircraft
structural fatigue testing (removed May 1995), brake wear limits
and brake performance for transport aircraft (removed May
1995), ground proximity warning systems (removed May 1992),
and aviation pilot substance abuse identification (removed July
1991).120 Other concerns and recommendations have been ad-
ded and removed since 1990, including commuter airline safety,
which was added in May 1995 and removed in April 1996; back-
ground checks for pilots, added in April 1996 and removed in
May 1998; and fires in cargo compartments, added in May 1997
after Valujet and removed in May 1998.121
Of the 11,161 safety recommendations issued by the NTSB
from 1967 to February 12, 1999, 36.3% regarded aviation is-
116 See id.
117 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., About the NTSB: The Investigative Process, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/abt-ntsb/invest.htm (Aug. 9, 1998).
118 See id.
119 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements





sues. 12 2 The area with the next most recommendations involved
marine concerns, with 2,158 recommendations, 19.3%.123 Rec-
ommendations can be classified into thirteen different
categories:
CEX, closed - exceeds recommended action;
CAA, closed - acceptable action;
CAAA, closed - acceptable alternative action;
CUA, closed - unacceptable action;
CUAS, closed - unacceptable action/superceded;
CR, closed - reconsidered;
CNILA, closed - no longer applicable;
CS, closed - superceded;
OAA, open - acceptable response;
OAAR, open - acceptable alternative response;
OUR, open - unacceptable response;
ORR, open - response received;
and OAR, open - await response. 124
For the 3,703 recommendations made by the NTSB to the
FAA between 1967 and 1999, the FAA closed 3,303, four of
which were classified as CEX, 2576 as CAA or CAAA, and 527 as
CUA or CUAA.125 Only 400 remain open, 219 of which are clas-
sified as OAA or OAAR, thirty-eight as OUR, and thirty-five are
awaiting a response. 126 Overall, for the period between 1967
and 1999, the FAA has an 83.2% acceptance rate of the NTSB's
recommendations, second only to MARAD, the U.S. Maritime
Administration with a 100% acceptance rate.127 For the last five
years, the FAA has an 88.04% acceptance rate of the 714 recom-
122 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendations Issued by Mode 1967
to February 12, 1999, at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/statistics/safetyrecommenda
tionsjissued-by.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).
123 See id.
124 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Status of Safety Recommendations ly Mode of Trans-
portation with Acceptance Rates as of February 12, 1999, at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/
statistics/acceptanceratemodal.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2000). The listed ac-
tions and responses pertain to the FAA's action or response to the NTSB's safety
recommendations.
125 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Status of Safety Recommendations ly Modal Admin-
istration in the Department of Transportation, at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/statistics/




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
mendations issued,128 well above the general acceptance average
of the eight agencies considered (FAA, FHIWA, NHTSA, FRA,
RSPA, FTA, USCG, and MARAD) of approximately 82.3%.129
The current list as of May 1999 contains three major aviation
warnings: airport runway incursions, the concern of explosive
mixtures in fuel tanks on transport aircraft, and airframe struc-
tural icing. 13  An examination of the complete list of recom-
mendations, however, lists the FAA as a recipient of the warning
and request in six of the ten, including the additional sugges-
tions for automatic recording devices, child/youth safety, and
human fatigue and hours-of-work policy.' 3'
1. Runway Incursions
The first aviation area of concern on the current list, left over
from the original list made in 1990, relates to accidents between
aircraft on runways. 13 2 The request regarding airport runway in-
cursions provides for safer control of aircraft on the ground.13
Safety recommendation A-91-29, dated June 21, 1991, resulted
from an accident in January 1990 in Atlanta, Georgia, but was
first addressed in recommendation A-79-42 after three near col-
lisions between June 1978 and February 1979.114 The NTSB's
goal is to find a warning system analogous to the alert system
used to issue a warning when airborne planes risk collision, but
that would alert controllers and crew to impending ground
collisions. 135
After the NTSB issued a runway incursion study in 1986, the
FAA took various measures to reduce the number of incidents,
resulting in a downward trend in accidents, which reached a low
128 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Federal Aviation Acceptance Rates for Safety Recom-
mendations Issued in the Year Listed, at http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/statistics/
faa fiveyears.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2000).
129 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendations Acceptance Rates by Year, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/statistics/acceptancerates_by-year.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2000).
10 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Most Wanted Safety Recommendations, Current List,
at http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/history.htm (May 1999).
131 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Most Wanted Safety Recommendations, at http://
www.ntsb.gov/Recs/chart.htm (May 1999).
132 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Runway Incursion/Ground Collision of Aircraft:






point in 1993.136 A reversal has occurred, however, illustrated by
a comparison of 186 incidents in 1994, increasing to 277 in 1996
and to more than 300 in 1997.'13 Concern over runway incur-
sions reached such a level that in 1998, the FAA announced that
it had "adopted a focused priority safety agenda," known as
"'Safer Skies.' '11 8 This program uses Area Surface Detection
(ASDE) radar and AMASS (Airport Movement Area Safety Sys-
tem) technology, and works with airlines and the aviation com-
munity to develop education programs designed to reduce the
incursion rate. 39 ASDE radar provides a controller with a radar-
based image of the airport with little symbols representing each
aircraft. 4 ° The AMASS system is essentially a software add-on.'
This sounds great doesn't it? The FAA is addressing the prob-
lem. But are they really? The NTSB remains concerned that
the testing and development of the breakthrough AMASS tech-
nology at various airports is running into delays.' 42 They do not
say why they think there are delays. Maybe they just know the
FAA well enough to be suspicious. The FAA maintained that it
would meet the August 2000 completion date for the tests it
originally promised, if it did not have any more "unexpected
technological problems." 4  This meant having the system in-
stalled at thirty-four airports by August 2000.'11 According to
the NTSB, the FAA said in a letter dated April 6, 1999 that:
The FAA anticipates having the independent operational test
and evaluation (of AMASS) conducted in July 1999, the deploy-
ment decision in September 1999, and the last production sys-
tem operational by August 2000. In parallel with current testing
efforts, the FAA and NATCA have agreed to conduct a quick
human factors review of AMASS during April 1999. The agency
still anticipates that all 40 production systems can be operational
136 See id.
137 See Nat'! Transp. Safety Bd., Runway Incursion/Ground Collision of Aircraft:




140 See FAA Collision-Prevention Program Delayed; New Radar System Now Scheduled
for 2002 Deployment, KANSAS CITY STAR, Oct. 3, 1999, at A12.
141 See id.
142 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Runway Incursion/Ground Collision of Aircraft:
Safety Recommendations A-91-29, at http://www.ntsb.gov.recs.runways.htm (June
12, 1991).
143 Id.
144 SeeJames T. McKenna, FAA Gains Ground on Update Problems, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Sept. 27, 1999, at 49.
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by August 2000. However, this date could be jeopardized should
significant unanticipated changes of enhancements be required
following the review."' 5
Interestingly, the FAA issued this letter despite the fact that
only three AMASS systems had been delivered by 1999, although
the FAA and Northrop Grumman had been working on this pro-
gram since 1990.146 Unfortunately, the NTSB has not updated
their web site regarding this issue, but a variety of newspaper
articles from October 1999 reported that the NTSB's fears were
founded, as the FAA apparently had another two-year delay with
the AMASS project, which now will not be ready until 2002.147
AMASS was originally scheduled for implementation in 1992,
but has been fraught with budget problems, technical difficul-
ties, and a general lack of organization and coordination."' An-
other problem is the actual system itself, which is essentially
radar aimed at the ground. This means the signals can be
blocked or deflected by any number of things, such as buildings
and other ground clutter."' According to Bill Blackmer, the
head of the Air Traffic Controller Union's Safety and Technol-
ogy Department, "'Shooting radar at the ground is not the best
idea."" 150 In addition, AMASS has had problems with both its
software and with providing false alarms, and ASDE has
problems with blind spots and double images.'
Runway incursions rose to 325 in 1998, and fifty-nine people
have died in five runway crashes over the last ten years. 15 2 Obvi-
ously, something must be done, and it seems that even the FAA
has finally realized this. According to Steven Zaidman, the
FAA's Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions, "'I
145 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Runway Incursion/Ground Collision of Aircraft:
Safety Recommendations A-91-29, at http://www.ntsb.gov.recs.runways.htm (June
12, 1991).
146 See McKenna, FAA Gains Ground on Update Problems, supra note 144.
147 See Don Phillips, New FAA Radar System Has Yet to Take Flight, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at 30; see also FAA Collision-Prevention Program Delayed; New
Radar System Now Scheduled for 2002 Deployment, supra note 140; Problems Plague
System to Halt Runway Collisions, LAs VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct. 3, 1999, at 8A.
148 See Phillips, New FAA Radar System Has Yet to Take Flight, supra note 147.
14 See FAA Collision-Prevention Program Delayed; New Radar System Now Scheduled
for 2002 Deployment, supra note 140.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 See Phillips, New FAA Radar System Has Yet to Take Flight, supra note 147.
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think the FAA bit off more than it could chew. I think it was too
much."153
The airline accident with the highest death toll resulted from
a runway incursion in 1977, when a KLM 747 collided with a Pan
Am 747 in the Canary Islands, killing 538 people. 154 The colli-
sion was the exact type of incident AMASS is designed to
prevent.
A more recent incident on April 1, 1999 at Chicago's O'Hare
International Airport involving two passenger aircraft, an Air
China 747 and a Korean Air 747 with a combined total of 387
crew and passengers, highlighted the continuing and potential
devastation of such a ground collision.1 5 5 According to the
NTSB, while the Air China craft was leaving the runway, a con-
troller cleared the Korean Air flight for takeoff, resulting in the
Korean Air flight crossing between twenty-five to fifty feet over
the top of the Air China plane. 56 About fifty-six percent of run-
way incursions involve "pilot deviations," and the rest are consid-
ered "operational errors" blamed on controllers, vehicles, or
pedestrians who wander into restricted areas. 157 There are re-
ports that make this O'Hare incident even scarier, such as the
allegation that the Air China pilots became confused and the
plane wandered back on the runway in front of the Korean Air
flight,158 not that they just had not managed to leave the runway,
as the NTSB reported.
An even more recent occurance makes the O'Hare incident
sound petty. Early in December 1999, the crew of a US Airways
plane (Metrojet Flight 2998-Metrojet is a discount carrier
owned and operated by US Airways) refused a flight controller's
instructions to take off on a foggy night in Providence, Rhode
Island.'59 Apparently, a United Airlines 757 landed on the run-
way and was given instructions to get to the terminal, but be-
came confused and ended up back on the original runway. 160 A
Federal Express cargo jet took off on this runway and passed
directly over the lost United jet. Although it is unclear how
153 Id.
154 SeeJames R. Asker, ed., AMASS Amiss, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4,
1999, at 23.




159 See Don Phillips, Runway Near Miss Probed; Pilots Averted Crash by Ignoring
Controller, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at A01.
16 See id.
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close the planes were, the sound of the FedEx plane taking off
can reportedly be heard clearly on a tape of the United crew
telling the control tower that they were concerned about their
location. 6 ' After hearing the United crew's concerns, the US
Airways crew refused to takeoff until the United flight reached
the terminal, frustrating the controller. 62 The weather was such
that it was not possible to see the runways from the control
tower or to see one end of the runway from the other end. 63
Had an AMASS system been in place, it likely would have sup-
ported the US Airways crew's concerns about taking off in such
a situation.
Another incident occurred on November 22, 1999 at LAX
when a United Airlines flight had to lift abruptly to miss an Aer-
omexico plane that had "blundered" onto the runway in front of
it.164 The United 757 evidently passed only about sixty feet
above the Aeromexico flight.
165
A report in Air Safety Week in August 1999 listed airports with
the greatest number of runway incursion incidents - these air-
ports are both large and small. The magazine, however, made
note of Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport, one of the larg-
est and busiest in the country which made this list. DFW's re-
cord is two to three times better than the other airports on the
list, possibly due to its widely-spaced, parallel runways.' 66
With reports such as these, it is no wonder that a system ad-
dressing runway incursions has made it to the top of the NTSB's
most wanted list. What is surprising is that the FAA has not
managed to actually do anything about the problem, and has
not really made any progress on its attempts until the last few
months. The FAA has finally consolidated all of its programs
addressing runway incursions under one director, who has the
authority "to cross organizational boundaries that have often de-
feated programs in the past."'67 John Mayrhofer is the new di-
rector of this program, and he claims that runway incidents have
started a new decline, hopefully due in part to the FAA's work
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FAA has worked on implementing "education and training for
pilots and controllers .... surface-detection radar and . .. air-
port signage.' ' 169 These actions are definitely steps in the right
direction, but another problem has surfaced with all the delays:
will the new AMASS system be adequate for present-day airports
with the huge increase in air traffic over the past decade? Even
the FAA admits there is a problem, and "officials have said that
the system may never live up to its original promise."170
2. De-icing
The recommendation regarding airframe structural icing has
been issued twice, on August 15, 1996 and November 30,
1998.171 It is classified as an acceptable response to the prob-
lem, and the file is open, awaiting response from the FAA.'1 2
The original recommendations regarding icing on aircraft struc-
tures, which arose from a 1981 NTSB study, sat in an Open-Un-
acceptable Response (OUR) file awaiting some sort of action for
over fifteen years.'7 3 The current recommendations stem from
two aircraft incidents: American Eagle Flight 4184, which en-
countered in-flight icing conditions and suffered a loss of con-
trol in Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994; and Comair
Flight 3272, which encountered in-flight icing conditions and
suffered an "uncontrolled collision" with the ground in Monroe,
Michigan on January 9, 1997.174
The first part of these recommendations address icy condi-
tions specifically. A-96-54 recommends that icing criteria pub-
lished in 14 CFR sections 23 and 25 be revised and that icing
certification be expanded "to include freezing drizzle/freezing
rain and mixed water/ice crystal conditions, as necessary. ' v5 A-
96-55 requests revisions of the Federal Aviation Regulations' ic-
ing certification requirements "to specify the numerical meth-
ods to be used in determining median volumetric diameter and
liquid water content during certification tests.' 76
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Airframe Structural Icing Safety Recommendations,





176 Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Airframe Structural Icing Safety Recommendations, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/airice.htm (Nov. 30, 1998).
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The recommendations then address the problems with the
certification of aircraft to fly in icy conditions. A-96-56 requests
a revision of icing certification testing to ensure that planes are
tested in all conditions for which they are certified to operate,
or that they at least prove somehow that they are capable of fly-
ing in those conditions. 77 It also requests that if such proof can-
not be provided, flight crews should be given the means for
determining when outside conditions exceed those in which the
aircraft can be safely operated. 17s
A-96-69 suggests the research and development of on-board
systems that can detect freezing drizzle and rain and alert the
flight crew to such weather, as well as to the resulting ice
buildup. 179 A-98-99 requests that ice research, development,
and implementation of these revisions be made immediately.18
A-98-100 requests that turbo-prop planes, which are currently
certified to fly in icy conditions, have their certifications re-
viewed and undergo additional testing to keep their
certification.181
The FAA has made some response to each individual recom-
mendation, classifying A-96-54 and A-96-55 as Open-Acceptable
Response (OAR), and evaluating "severe ice roll control . . . of
14 CFR Parts 23 and 25 aircraft equipped with pneumatic de-
icing boots and unpowered ailerons that are used in regularly
scheduled passenger service in the United States," as well as issu-
ing airworthiness directives for eighteen of those aircraft in re-
sponse to A-96-56 and A-96-69.112 With regard to A-98-99, the
FAA wrote the NTSB another letter stating that it was already
addressing the issues raised in this safety recommendation in
actions taken for other recommendations so that it would not
do anything further in response. 183 This same letter also stated
that the FAA would not do anything regarding turbo-propeller
driven aircraft until the ice certification regulations were revised
and the situation was reevaluated. 18 4 Does anybody have any
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The FAA requested that both A-96-56 and A796-69 be closed
due to its completed and future planned actions, but the NTSB
refused to do so, commenting that because of "FAA's slow pro-
gress on similar icing safety recommendations issued by the
Safety Board in 1981 and [due] to the importance of these rec-
ommendations, the Safety Board will continue to monitor the
FAA's progress on these issues."185
Another interesting response of the FAA to these recommen-
dations was its refusal to prohibit planes from flying in icy condi-
tions, for which the aircraft have not been proven to be safe,
because "compliance would require the flight crew to know ex-
actly where the icing conditions exist for which the airplane has
not been tested."'8 6 The FAA rationalized this with the state-
ment, "'Given the absence of technology, the FAA does not be-
lieve an adequate means exists that would provide pilots with
the tools to determine positively where icing conditions exist
that exceed the limits for aircraft certification."1 87
Ok, so pilots are not able to tell the exact places in the sky
where icy conditions exceed the perimeters of safety for the air-
craft they are flying. That is understandable. But does that
mean that they should be allowed to just fly through anything?
What about issuing guidelines regarding the termination of a
flight in hazardous icy conditions or guidelines on how to avoid
such conditions? If such guidelines already exist, why does the
FAA not refer to them in response to this recommendation, if
for no other reason than to refresh everyone's memory, or at
least make it look as though the FAA has thought about the
problem a little before dismissing it with a few sentences? In any
case, at least the NTSB seems to feel that whatever the FAA has
done, or says it is going to do, it is either not enough or is un-
likely to occur. Unfortunately, just because one agency realizes
another's responses are inadequate does not mean the problem
is fixed, or even being taken seriously by the FAA, which is the
only entity that can do anything about the risk and the problem.
All the NTSB can do is identify problems and hope someone
listens.
185 Id.
186 Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Airframe Structural Icing Safety Recommendations, at
http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/air-ice.htm (Nov. 30, 1998).
187 Id.
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3. Explosive Fuel Tanks
This recommendation stems from one of the most well-known
aviation tragedies in recent history. A plane mysteriously ex-
plodes a few miles off the coast of East Moriches, New York on
its way to Paris in July 1996.18" Wild theories are proposed: ter-
rorists shot a missile, the Navy shot it down, a bomb exploded.
Everyone is surprised when none of those theories pans out. In-
stead, TWA Flight 800 was the victim of explosive fumes in the
plane's empty center fuel tank.
The NTSB's recommendation, issued December 31, 1996,
states:
A-96-175
Pending implementation of design modification, require
modification in operational procedures to reduce the poten-
tial for explosive fuel-air mixtures in the fuel tanks of trans-
port category aircraft. In the B-747, consideration should be
given to refueling the center wing fuel tank (CWT) before
flight whenever possible from cooler ground fuel tanks,
proper monitoring and management of the CWT fuel temper-
ature, and maintaining an appropriate minimum fuel quan-
tity in the CWT.
A-96-1 76
Require that the B-747 flight handbooks of TWA and other
operators of B-747s and other aircraft in which fuel tank tem-
perature cannot be determined by flight crews be immedi-
ately revised to reflect the increases in CWT fuel temperatures
found by flight tests, including operational procedures to re-
duce the potential for exceeding CWT temperature
limitations. 89
After the NTSB made recommendation A-96-175, it con-
ducted flight tests, which showed that risks of explosive vapors in
the fuel tanks could be reduced by fuel management and lim-
ited use of air conditioning packs.19 0 In response to this study,
the FAA formed an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC), the majority of the members Boeing and Airbus em-
188 See Nat'] Transp. Safety Bd., Explosive Mixtures in Fuel Tanks on Transport Cate-
gory Aircraft, Safety Recommendations A-96-175 and -176, at http://www.ntsb.gov/





ployees, to examine the fuel tank issues.19 This group deter-
mined that "operational changes would not eliminate
flammable conditions in some flight conditions" and [so they]
did not recommend adoption of operational changes."'1 92 They
did, at least, determine that the flammable state of vapors in fuel
tanks should be reduced from thirty percent to around six per-
cent.1 93 In addition, while the FAA has created a new Special
Federal Aviation Regulation that requires the development of
fuel tank inspection and maintenance programs, as well as air-
worthiness directives for fuel pumps and reviews of certification,
it still has done nothing to develop procedures that can reduce
the possibility of combustible fuel-tank mixtures. 9 4 Because of
the FAA's inaction with regard to this threat, the NTSB classified
A-96-175 as Open-Unacceptable Response (OUR) in July
1997.195
The NTSB also found that the TWA Flight Handbook for the
B-747 stated that "pack operation," the use of air conditioning
packs, could raise CWT temperature between ten and twenty de-
grees Fahrenheit. 96 Boeing flight tests in August 1996, how-
ever, showed that the temperature could rise forty degrees, and
NTSB tests in July 1997 found temperature increases over sixty
degrees. 97 The FAA seems to have ignored these test results
and did not announce that any corrections in the Flight Hand-
book should be made. Because of this lack of response,
191 See id.
192 Id. There is a serious problem with the makeup of this group, also known
as the Fuel Tank Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG). See id. For one
thing, if you want to really evaluate a problem like this, you need people besides
the engineers and management of the companies that made the faulty item. Not
only do they not want to have to implement anything that might be costly to their
operations, they do not want to admit that they were wrong, either with their
designs, maintenance instructions, or materials, because that means admitting
that they are responsible for the lives that were lost due to their mistakes or over-
sights. While it is useful to have some of these people on a group doing such a
study, it would be more convincing and effective to have disinterested, but in-
formed, parties make a decision that extra precautions were not necessary, rather
than the people who could be viewed as shouldering a large portion of the blame
for the accident.
193 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Explosive Mixtures in Fuel Tanks on Transport Cate-
gory Aircraft Safety Recommendations A-96-175 and -176, at http://www.ntsb.gov/
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A-96-176 has also been designated Open-Unacceptable Re-
sponse since July 1997.198
IV. AFTER VALUJET
A. HAZMAT REGULATIONS
Although the NTSB wrote a report strongly advising the instal-
lation of smoke detectors in class D cargo holds, this recommen-
dation was soon overshadowed and replaced by controversy
regarding the issue of banning hazardous cargo on passenger
flights-not that hazardous cargo was anything new. In 1973, a
PanAm flight was diverted from New York to Boston "when the
crew reported smoke in the cockpit."199 The plane was unable
to land due to dense smoke and crashed, killing all three crew
members.0 ' Although the NTSB was unable to determine the
exact cause of the crash, it suspected that nitric acid packed in
sawdust may have begun leaking in the cargo hold.201 In 1986, a
DC-10 landed in Chicago from Hawaii and everyone dis-
embarked.20 2 Shortly afterward, a fire started from what the
NTSB determined was the mishandling of oxygen generators,
destroying the plane.203 The NTSB then began to recommend
that the FAA ban hazardous cargo on commercial airlines, but
the FAA rejected this idea as being too inconvenient for the air-
lines in exchange for the small benefit it might provide to the
public. 20 4 That same year, the FAA did, however, decide that
the way to address the problem of fires in cargo or baggage com-
partments was to require airlines to test the compartments an.
make sure that their liners could withstand a fire, [and] make*
sure the fire cannot burn through the cargo-hold liner .... But
the FAA rejected a requirement for fire detection systems in class
D cargo compartments [because] ... the danger of a cargo fire
was "beyond the scope of its rulemaking notice."205
Other incidents involving hazardous materials on commercial
jets continued. In February 1988, an American Airlines jet ex-
198 See Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Explosive Mixtures in Fuel Tanks on Transport Cate-
gory Aircraft Safety Recommendations A-96-175 and -176, at http://www.ntsb.gov/
recs/explosive_tanks.htm (Dec. 31, 1996).
199 SCHIAVO, supra note 1, at 26-27.








perienced smoke in the passenger cabin. 20 6 The NTSB deter-
mined that "'hydrogen peroxide solution (an oxidizer) and a
sodium orthosilicate-based mixture"' had been loaded into the
same compartment of the plane, and a fire had started after the
peroxide began to leak.2°v The cargo compartment did not con-
tain the fire, and the floor of the passenger cabin eventually be-
came hot and soft, although no one was injured.20 8 In 1992 and
1993, fires broke out in planes shipping oxygen generators that
had not been declared as hazardous material.20 9 In 1993, the
FAA responded to the NTSB's urging for fire detection equip-
ment in aircraft by stating that "it did not believe that fire/
smoke detection systems would provide a significant degree of
protection to occupants of airplanes" and the 350 million dol-
lars needed to install the detectors would not be justified.2 10
Three years later, oxygen generators placed next to tires in
the class D cargo hold of Valujet Flight 592 started a fire that
took the unwary crew by surprise right before they plunged into
the Everglades. 21' Two weeks after the crash, a temporary ban
on shipping oxygen generators in commercial aircraft was is-
sued by the Department of Transportation's Research and Spe-
cial Program Administration, and the FAA finally issued a
warning of its own.212 It made no mention, however, of smoke
detectors, promising only "swift enforcement action" against
anyone who tried to ship oxygen generators as cargo on passen-
ger aircraft. 21 3
More than a year after the crash, the FAA finally proposed
and-instituted a requirement that old cargo holds must be in-
stalled with fire detection equipment by 2001.214 The progress
on the installation of this equipment, however, has been slow.
With a little over one year remaining before the deadline, only
about eleven percent of the affected planes had the safety up-
206 See id.
207 Id.
208 See id. at 27-28.
2 9 See SCHiAVO, supra note 1, at 28.
210 Id.
211 See id. at 28-9.
212 See id. at 29.
213 Id.
214 See Airliners Still Carry Hazardous Materials, FLORIDA TODAY, Sept. 7, 1999, at
03A.
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grades in place.215 About 1000 DC-9s and almost that many 737s
still needed to be converted.216
Although hazardous materials have now been banned on pas-
senger planes, they still seem to show up. Oxygen generators
have either been intercepted or have flown on passenger jets an
estimated twenty times since the Everglades crash.217 Some of
the enforcement problems may include the possibility that in-
spectors are not as well trained as they are thought to be and the
fact that violations of the ban can take up to two years to pro-
cess. 218 In addition, the large fines threatened are usually
greatly reduced, and airlines have not exactly jumped at the re-
quirement to install new equipment on old planes, particularly
those that would likely be retired before the deadline.2 19
Obviously, banning is not enough, and enforcement issues
need to be seriously addressed. In addition, one would think
that airlines would not be so reluctant to comply, considering
that the installation of smoke detection equipment and the
proper handling of hazardous materials are relatively small mea-
sures to take when one considers the implications and repercus-
sions another Valujet-type wreck would cause. It is, in fact, in
the best interest of everybody to comply: airlines save planes and
their reputations, passengers are safer, and the FAA does its job
and gains respect.
If the FAA were to shorten the time-span allowed for compli-
ance, and then actually impose and enforce costly penalties for
non-compliance, airlines might take action. Of course, cpst is
an issue, and the FAA is unlikely to impose and enforce a costly
program under time-pressure that could damage the airlines'
profit margins, even if the dual mandate has been eliminated.
One area the FAA has handled well is spot inspections at na-
tional airports. A recent inspection at DFW uncovered approxi-
mately twenty violations of the hazardous materials ban on
passenger planes and of procedures for handling hazardous
materials. Yet, while the inspection is good, the question re-
maining is what will be done about the violations and will penal-
ties be enforced?
215 See Slow Progress Report, AIR SAFETY WK., Sept. 13, 1999.
216 See id.




In mid-1999, the FAA did issue over $1.2 million in fines to
fifteen different companies because of hazmat violations.22 °
Regulations violated included "improper packaging, improper
classifying, and allowing untrained employees to ready packages
for shipping. ' 221 The materials that were being shipped fea-
tured such products as "a variety of explosives, corrosives, oxidiz-
ers, and flammable gases, '222 all which either leaked or emitted
potent fumes while being loaded onto the planes. 22' Explosives
and corrosives? Really, one can not help but wonder what these
companies were thinking, as well as what the FAA was thinking
by merely issuing fines for such a violation. One might hope
that the companies would be shut down or at the very least not
be allowed to package or load cargo onto planes without con-
stant scrutiny and some sort of training. However, the fact that
the FAA actually did issue fines, in light of its consistent refusal
to enforce regulations, does say something - hopefully, that
things are changing at the FAA.
Another measure that might be helpful, though regrettably
expensive, would be education programs for crews who handle
the hazardous materials, detailing the problems and risks of not
following safety procedures. Again, however, enforcement of a
required program, as well as evaluation and implementation, is
an issue.
On September 2, 1999, smoke in the cockpit forced an Air-
Tran DC-9 to make an emergency landing in Atlanta.224 Air-
Tran is the renamed Valujet Airlines, and since it is considered a
new airline, it is undergoing "heightened scrutiny" during its
first five years in business as a result of the FAA's Certification
Standardization & Evaluation Team (CSET) .225 The CSET pro-
gram was established in late 1996, partly as a result of the Valujet
tragedy.2 26 Obviously, something more must be done.
B. LEGAL REPERCUSSIONS
Three years after the 1996 Valujet tragedy, the blame is still
being passed around. On July 13, 1999, the Miami-Dade County
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State Attorney made history by indicting SabreTech on 110
counts of murder and manslaughter for falsely labeling the oxy-
gen canisters that caused the fire as empty and loading them
without required safety caps, which should have prevented the
tanks from exploding. 227
In addition, a federal indictment was issued for three
SabreTech employees "on charges of conspiracy, making false
statements and mislabeling and mishandling hazardous mate-
rial. ' 228 The U.S. Attorney's office in Miami also included
twenty-four federal counts against SabreTech. 229 The three
men, Eugene Florence, Mauro Valenzuela, both mechanics, and
Daniel Gonzalez, SabreTech's Vice President of Maintenance
and Repairs, could have faced a total of $2.7 million dollars in
fines and up to fifty-five years in prison if they were convicted.23 °
While the 1996 crash set off a surge of requests for hazmat
training for airline employees, that trend died down. 21 Now a
new concern has arisen. The indictments have had significant
effects on the insurance industry. Under Florida law, the case
may result in punitive damages, putting a new pressure on air-
line insurers. 232
Various parties found it ironic that although the NTSB also
placed blame for the crash on the FAA for failing to supervise
Valujet properly, as well as on the airline itself for failing to su-
pervise its subcontractor, only SabreTech was being charged.233
Kenneth Quinn, counsel for SabreTech and, ironically, former
Chief Counsel for the FAA, stated that "[f]or obvious reasons,
the federal government is not going after itself criminally for
failures to oversee Valujet properly, to mandate smoke detection
and fire suppression systems, and to aggressively combat the
dangers posed by hazardous materials for more than a decade -
all errors that could have prevented this tragedy. ' 234 While
SabreTech may have reason to be defensive as it faces a $2.25
million dollar fine and is out of business because of the inci-
227 See Krause, supra note 220; LLOYD's LST INT'L, July 16, 1999, at 1999 WL
21565854.
228 Mechanics License Reinstated After Valujet Crash, FLA. TODAY, July 15, 1999, at
03B.
229 See Ed Tripp, Feds, Florida Indict SabreTech, Employees in Valujet Crash, AERO
SAFETY & MAINT., July 23, 1999, at 3.
230 See id.
231 See Krause, supra note 220.
232 See LLoYD's LiST INT'L, supra note 227.
233 See Krause, supra note 220.
234 Tripp, supra note 229.
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dent, Quinn does have a point. Is the government helping the
FAA pass on responsibility and place blame elsewhere so that its
own shortcomings might be overlooked? What would it take to
punish the FAA for its inaction, mismanagement, and poor job
performance? Fines certainly would not be a plausible punish-
ment. Another question that has been raised is, why did it take
so long for charges to be brought? Essentially, the facts leading
up to the crash of Flight 592 have been known since 1996, yet it
took three years to take action against any parties, and even
then, only one party was singled out.2 5 Two have, effectively,
been exonerated of any wrongdoing by being left out of the
indictments.
James Landrum, a relative of a crash victim who happened to
be a flight attendant for another airline, also criticized the omis-
sions: "These indictments, in their current form, target mini-
mum-wage workers, while the well-documented, illegal actions
of Valujet management are not even addressed. This amounts
to nothing more than punishing schoolyard drug users, while
absolving the drug lords. '23 6 Landrum's statement refers to
Valenzuela's contention that he was given orders to sign the
form allowing the oxygen canisters to be loaded on Flight
592.237
The situation regarding the reinstatement of Eugene Flo-
rence's mechanic's license is even more disturbing. Florence, as
well as Valenzuela, lost his license due to the Valujet crash, but
"won it back" barely a year later.2 8 A license or certificate allows
a mechanic to sign off on cards indicating that an assignment
has been completed; these cards are required at every step of a
235 See Krause, supra note 220.
236 News Briefs, AIR SAFETY WK., July 19, 1999; see also Let Punishment Be Painful,
AIR SAFETY WK.,June 12, 2000, at 2000 WL 4446579 (listing Mary Shiavo's recom-
mendations for SabreTech's fines and restitution regarding the Valujet crash).
237 See Valujet Suspects Surrender, Three Men Deny Responsibility for Airliner Crash,
FLA. TODAY, July 16, 1999, at 06B. A federal judge ordered SabreTech to pay two
million in fines, less than half of the possible maximum, and nine million in
restitution for the part it played in the Valujet Flight 592 crash. See David
Cazares, SabreTech Fined $11 Million, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Business,
Aug. 15, 2000, at 2000 WL 22190645. Two of the three SabreTech employees
indicted were acquitted of the federal charges, while the third remains a fugitive.
See id. The state criminal trial for the 110 murder and manslaughter charges filed
against SabreTech is set for October 2000. See id.
238 Mechanic's License Reinstated After Valujet Crash, supra note 228.
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maintenance project.239 Without a license, a mechanic can hold
only low-level positions in the aviation industry.24 0
One of the indictments charged that Florence falsely signed
off on work cards representing that steps had been taken on
maintenance assignments, which were not performed.24'
Mechanics only have to wait one year before seeking reinstate-
ment of their license, and Florence regained his on May 9, 1998
before the conclusion of the criminal investigation. 42 The
FAA's regional legal staff provided no information on whether
the indictments would affect Florence's reissued license.243
Few would dispute the idea that a mechanic under criminal
investigation should not be able to regain his ability to supervise
projects, particularly when the reason that he lost the license
granting him that privilege in the first place is the direct cause
of the criminal investigation. A relative of one of the victims of
Flight 592 called Florence's reinstatement "'frightening and dis-
tressing.' "244 Again, any system that allows this kind of loophole
contains obvious flaws, which need to be addressed and
eliminated.
C. SAFETY INSPECTIONS, ATOS, CSET
According to Mary Shiavo, the former Inspector General of
the Department of Transportation, airline safety standards really
began to decline in 1978 following the deregulation of the air-
line industry, causing airlines to "adopt business practices sacri-
ficing safety for profitability. '245 Schiavo, a major critic of the
FAA as discussed earlier, also placed blame on that agenicy-for.
the declining safety standards. 46 In addition, with the huge
growth in the aviation industry, predictions have surfaced of in-
creased airline accidents - the White House Commission Report
on Aviation Safety predicted up to one major airline disaster a





243 See Mechanics License Reinstated After Valujet Crash, supra note 228.
244 Id.
245 Air Passengers Must Look After Their Own Safety: Shiavo, JAPAN TRANsP. SCAN,
Aug. 2, 1999.
246 See id.
247 See Paul Richfield, Outlook: Regulations and Certification, the FAA's Challenge:
Lower the Accident Rate While Keeping Pace With Technological Intake, Bus. & COM.
AVIATION, Aug. 1, 1999, at 92.
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So what is the FAA doing to improve informed opinion of its
actions and of aviation safety?
Under its 'Safer Skies' program, the FAA has pledged "to re-
duce the commercial aviation accident rate by 80 percent, and
the general aviation accident rate by 15 percent by 2007."248 In
order to reach this goal, the agency claims to be addressing the
six most prevalent causes of airline disasters: "controlled flight
into terrain (CFIT), pilot loss of control, runway incursions, un-
contained engine failures, approach and landing accidents, and
weather."249
According to the FAA's Deputy Associate Administrator for
Regulation and Certification, Margaret Gilligan, "'Safer Skies is
an integrated effort to analyze all the accidents, prioritize them
and intervene. . . . We're looking for trends that we couldn't
find when we examined accidents individually.' "250 In addition,
the agency created the Certification Standardization and Evalua-
tion Team (CSET), a new approach to oversee all new airlines
seeking certification.251 CSET provides FAA field offices with
technical knowledge regarding airline operations, the lack of
which was one of the problems identified in the agency exami-
nation after by the Valujet crash.252
The FAA has also instituted a program called "One Level of
Safety" in order to increase oversight of regional carriers in an
effort to hold them to the same safety standards as the major
commercial airliners. In addition, the FAA is planning to dab-
ble more in accident investigation, "challeng[ing] the NTSB's
limited budget and non-regulatory status. 253 The goal is to do
on-site investigations of all general aviation accidents, and eighty
percent of all non-fatal accidents. In the past, most of the FAA's
accident investigation involved only a phone call, but as Gilligan
put it, "' [We] think there's more to learn if the inspector sees it
for himself.' "254
Other areas being addressed include increasing random drug





252 See Richfield, supra note 247.
253 Id.
254 See id. It only took the FAA forty years to figure out that a real-life picture is
worth a thousand words over the phone.
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training air traffic controllers, and possibly limiting commercial
sightseeing flights over national parks.255
So it sounds like the FAA has undertaken several great pro-
grams to address chronic problems in the aviation industry. But
are they going to be able to achieve any of these goals?
A report released in July 1999 by the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO), "the investigative arm of Congress," focused on the
FAA's Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS) .256 The
FAA launched ATOS in 1998 in order "to replace thousands of
spot inspections with a more systematic analysis of the ten major
carrier's operations. '257 The "'thousands of spot inspections"'
refer to the FAA's Performance Tracking and Reporting System
(PTRS), the predecessor of ATOS. 258 Essentially, the ATOS pro-
gram is designed to allow FAA inspectors, who once would have
spent their time with major airlines, to focus their scrutiny on
regional carriers and start-up airlines. 259 ATOS is a direct result
of the criticism levied toward the FAA after the Valujet crash.
The GAO report characterized the ATOS program as a "'sig-
nificant promise for helping the FAA overcome deficiencies in
its past approach to aviation safety inspections.' ,,260 However,
the GAO also reported that ATOS was "plagued with a lack of
clear guidance from headquarters, high turnover, a lack of ex-
perience and training, and an overly ambitious implementation
schedule. 261' Essentially, the FAA needed to "take a step back
and regroup. '262 The FAA protested the GAO's "'unnecessarily
255 See id.
256 Corrections Urged to Safety Inspections, AIR SAFETY WK., July 12, 1999.
257 Id.
258 See News Briefs, AIR SAFETY WK., Feb. 14, 2000.
259 See New Safety Inspection Program Announced Fewer Inspectors for the Ten Largest
Airlines as FAA Plans to Redeploy Staff to Other Carriers, AIR SAFETY WK., May 18,
1998.
260 Corrections Urged to Safety Inspections, supra note 256. Actually, despite the
GAO's opinion, I do not feel that analyzing the typical way airlines do things to
see if they present dangers is better than the traditional FAA policy of imposing
fines after infractions of regulations. What is there to guarantee that the airlines
are doing things the typical way? Nothing. How would the FAA know? It
wouldn't. Airlines could get lax and start taking shortcuts, and the FAA would
never know until disaster struck. Even just a slow degradation of policy could
lead to disaster if no one is around to catch the problem. In addition, under
ATOS, there is no enforcement, no way to keep the airlines acting within policy.
So, not only would the FAA have no idea about a change, but there is nothing to
keep an airline from changing its practices.
261 Id. See alsoJennifer Michels & Tricia A. Holly, Dateline: Washington, TRAvEL
AGENT, July 26, 1999, at 103.
262 Corrections Urged to Safety Inspections, supra note 256.
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negative tone"' in the report, although the agency did agree
substantively with the contents.
263
The GAO evaluation might be considered generous in light of
all the problems it found with the ATOS program. For instance,
some of the ATOS inspectors lacked licenses to fly the aircraft
they inspected or to perform flight checks of the pilots. 264 Some
of the inspection reports omitted basic information like the
name of the airline, the model of the planes, or the pilot identi-
fication numbers.265 Inspectors might also be doing their work
with the wrong standards - the GAO found that the FAA had
issued inspectors weight and balance limits for commuter airline
standards to investigate and inspect the weight and balance of
the major airlines.266 In addition, the ATOS database is not
compatible with a pre-existing database, the Safety Performance
Analysis System, which holds analyzed data from the PTRS pro-
gram.267 A serious shortage of inspectors has also plagued the
program; one team had eleven members out of twenty-eight re-
assigned but not replaced.268
Further proof of an ongoing problem regarding mismanage-
ment of ATOS was uncovered recently at a NTSB hearing on the
crash of American Airlines Flight 1420 in Little Rock. S. C. Val-
entine, the FAA's principal operations inspector for American
Airlines under the ATOS program, commented that he did not
have enough inspectors to do hisjob.269 "'We were understaffed
before ATOS."' 270 Apparently, due to a hiring freeze, he was
missing over a third of the staff necessary to adequately cover
the airline and did not have anyone who could analyze the data
his staff had gathered.2 7 1 Analyzing data is ATOS's main strategy
for avoiding spot inspections of the major airlines.
263 See id. This protest may uncover a key problem within the FAA, that of char-
acterization. Perhaps the FAA feels that by not discussing problems in a negative
way, the problems will not be negative. Then again, maybe the FAAjust does not
understand, or refuses to acknowledge, how serious some of its problems really
are.
264 See id. This omission could make a complete inspection quite difficult.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See Corrections Urged to Safety Inspections, AIR SAErv WK., July 12, 1999.
268 See id.
26 See News Briefs, supra note 258.
270 Id.
271 See id. A member of the NTSB, who was present at the hearings, reportedly
asked Valentine how the data was being analyzed with the staff shortages and
received the answer, "'Simply put, it's not."' Id. Valentine went on to inform the
NTSB that he was "shifting and targeting resources based on his long experience
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These deficiencies are serious; these problems have a direct
impact on the efficiency and the effectiveness of the ATOS pro-
gram, as well as its usefulness. The FAA's defense to the GAO's
report was that it expected initial problems because of its aggres-
sive implementation of ATOS, but that it felt these problems
were worth it to get the program fully working sooner.272 The
lack of qualified inspectors seems to be an ongoing problem,
both before Valujet and for over a year since the implementa-
tion of ATOS. The FAA needs to understand that just because it
implements a program that is designed to fix the deficiencies of
the agency, does not mean the program will fulfill its purpose
when it suffers from serious implementation and planning
problems such as those listed above. Not until the FAA wakes
up, acknowledges the problems, and fixes them, can ATOS live
up to its full potential.
An important project, which has been the focus of the FAA,
has been undertaken with the European Joint Aviation Author-
ity (JAA) to standardize "ground proximity warning systems, ic-
ing protection, rain and hail ingestion, and common type
certification standards for new aircraft." 273 Standardization has
become particularly important, especially with regard to
language.
Currently, English is the official worldwide aviation language,
but there are many instances where the use of other languages
or poor English has caused confusion and dangerous situations.
Over 300 incident reports involving language difficulties have
been filed by air traffic controllers and pilots-some resulting in
crashes and "serious safety incidents. '274 The crash of American
Airlines Flight 965 into a mountain on approach to Cali, Colum-
bia significantly involved a language barrier between the En-
glish-speaking pilots and Spanish-speaking air-traffic controller,
as evidenced by the flight data recorder.275
in the industry, not on data that is supposed to be driving the ATOS effort." Id.
It would be interesting to hear the FAA's response to the fact that the inspector
for one of the nation's most prolific airlines has reverted to his experience and
intuition rather than basing his decisions on ATOS data, which he cannot get
because he has no analyst, but which is supposed to somehow correct a bunch of
the problems afflicting the FAA.
272 See Corrections Urged to Safety Inspections, supra note 256.
273 See Richfield, supra note 247.





Since the FAA has no authority outside the U.S., the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is responsible for rec-
ommending to foreign airlines that they use English or improve
their language skills. Unfortunately, the ICAO has no enforce-
ment authority and currently does not consider language to be a
significant issue.276 The FAA does, however, have authority in
United States airspace. Yet, according to Ron Morgan, the
FAA's Director of Air Traffic Control, there is no major problem
with language discrepancies in the U.S. 2 7 7 According to Mor-
gan, the FAA only found twenty-five aviation problems related to
language over a ten year period.27 However, another examina-
tion of the same data by "Dateline" NBC found more than 300
incidents - twenty-seven of those involved near mid-air colli-
sions.279 While the examinations may have been conducted with
differing standards for the definition of an "'incident,"' the dis-
crepancy between the two examinations is still profound and
disturbing.
Ninety-five of these language-related cases occurred at or near
U.S. airports. 2 0 At the very least, it is interesting to note that in
order to fly into the United States, foreign pilots must only com-
plete a form certifying that they hold a pilot's license in their
home country and that they can speak English. 28 ' They simply
check "yes" on the form in response to the question, "'Do you
read, speak and understand English?' 28 2
Most of the problems have involved U.S. pilots or English-
speaking pilots flying into other countries. 28 1 According to the
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, some of the most prob-
lematic airports in the last ten years include Aeropuerto Interna-
cional Benito Juarez in Mexico City with twenty incidents;
Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, France with twelve incidents;
and a number of airports each with six incidents-Orly Airport




279 See Dateline NBC, Plane English, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/35841.asp
(Jan. 18, 2000).
280 See id. Texas had its share of incidents. While no incidents were reported
at DFW or the other major Texas airports, two occurred at Fort Worth's
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Kimp'o International Airport in Seoul, South Korea; and Eldo-
rado Airport in Bogota, Columbia.284 A significant number of
incidents have also incurred at airports located in Los Cabos,
Mexico; Tokyo, Japan; Guatamala City, Guatamala; and Mon-
treal, Canada.28 5
The FAA claims to be working toward an agreement with
ICAO regarding worldwide English standards, but has no idea
when that standard might become the norm.286 According to
Tom Kramer, a pilot for a major airline who has been working
for the pilots union to establish worldwide standards, "'We
started this project on a global standard for aviation English ten
years ago. It's ten years later and we haven't changed a
thing.' "287
D. REPAIR STATIONS
A hot new topic in aviation safety involves maintenance
problems. Due to economic pressures, many airlines no longer
perform much of their own maintenance, instead contracting
out to repair stations, which consist largely of contract labor.288
In addition, many technicians today have less experience, pro-
viding further problems with maintenance.289
The NTSB began a one-year investigation of these mainte-
nance stations in 1999, partly induced by the July 1999 indict-
ment of SabreTech, the repair station which contracted for
much of Valujet's maintenance at the time of the Flight 592
crash, and three of its employees.29 ° Other incidents related to
contract maintenance have included an engine that dropped off
a 747 during takeoff and the crash of a regional airliner due to
missing screws on the horizontal stabilizer of the craft.291 The





288 See Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, A]R
SAFETY WK., Sept. 6, 1999.
289 See id.
290 See id.
291 See id. Improper maintenance has resulted in a variety of dangerous inci-
dents. In 1992, a Delta Airline's 737 lost its right engine after takeoff at an alti-
tude 200 feet. Luckily, there were no injuries. The subsequent investigation
showed that a maintenance impropriety resulted in the inadvertent application
of lubricant to the aft cone bolt, which, as a result, developed a fatigue crack and
caused the engine to fall off the plane in flight. Id. Another incident involving a
Lineas Aereas Privadas Argentinas 737 featured an engine that caught fire during
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horizontal stabilizer is the part on the plane's tail that allows the
nose of the plane to move up or down-the failure of this key
piece has been implicated in the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight
261 in January 2000.292
Between 1990 and 1996, a thirty percent increase occurred in
the aviation work performed by repair stations.293 During this
same period of time, the Service Difficulty Report (SDR)
database showed a 500 percent increase of "inadequate quality"
maintenance performed by third-party repair stations.294 Be-
tween 1985 and 1996, one out of every five major aircraft acci-
dents that occurred involved poor maintenance as a
contributing cause.295 Despite these statistics, contracting agree-
ments between repair stations and airlines have continued to in-
crease. By 1999, fifty percent of all aviation maintenance was
performed by parties other than the airlines.296
Some airlines or companies contract out to repair stations be-
cause of the idea that the experts best perform heavy mainte-
nance. 297 Major companies that outsource their maintenance
work include Southwest Airlines, which contracts out about half
of its heavy maintenance, and Federal Express, which contracts
out about eighty percent of its maintenance work.298 As Tony
Quillen, Southwest Airlines' Director of Heavy Maintenance
stated, "'Our core business is carrying passengers.' "299 In con-
trast, the core business of a maintenance station is, after all,
takeoff in Buenos Aires. The plane reached a height of only two feet before
settling back down to the ground, but then it overran the runway, ran through
the airport boundary crashing into eight cars on an adjacent road, and finally
plowed through a golf course before stopping. Seventy of the 115 on board died,
with one ground fatality. See id. The plane had reported problems with this en-
gine before takeoff, and three technicians reportedly were working on the prob-
lem when the plane was forced to depart after losing four positions for takeoff.
At the time of takeoff, the status of repair was unknown. See id.
292 See News and Events NTSB-Alaska Airlines Flight 261, at http://www.ntsb.gov/
events/2000/aka2611.defaut.htm (Feb. 2000); Jeff Wilson, Alaska Airlines Jet
Crashes Near L.A., AOL NEWS, Mar. 2, 2000.
293 See Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination,
supra note 288.
294 See id. The SDRs between 1989-1993 numbered 106, but rose to 631 be-
tween 1994 and 1998. See id.
295 See id. Eighty-five major accidents occurred during these years. See id.
296 See id.
297 See Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, AIR
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maintenance. The important element is to contract with a repu-
table station that is good at its specialty.
An opposing view also exists, as shown by United Airlines,
which contracts out less that twenty percent of its heavy mainte-
nance work. 00 United feels that by avoiding heavy reliance on
repair stations, it provides for a stable workforce with more flexi-
bility to respond to new airworthiness directives." 1 As Yvonne
Daverin, United's Quality Assurance Director, stated, "'Over the
years, we have developed our own core competencies.' "302
While outsourcing maintenance work can save costs, some
problems arise when the mechanics also provide the quality as-
surance. 303 In addition, a repair station with a contract to work
on the 737s of two different airlines may be faced with totally
different maintenance plans. A 737 that flies many short runs
each day, such as with Southwest Airlines, needs completely dif-
ferent maintenance than a plane that makes long flights across
the country each day.304 As a response to these concerns, the
FAA has begun to perform maintenance inspections more fre-
quently.3 5 According to R. A. Horn, Senior Vice President of
Maintenance and Technical Services for one of the country's
largest contract maintenance companies, TIMCO, the repair sta-
tions themselves have improved quality assurance by changing
the process "'from a paper review process to looking at the work
in progress.'306
Bart Crotty, an independent consultant who has conducted
audits of many repair stations, feels that the problems lie mainly
with the FAA and with small airlines (15-20 planes) relying on
small Part 145 repair stations (employing 100-200 people). ° v
These companies typically do not have good safety training pro-
300 See id.
301 See id.
302 Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination, supra
note 288.
303 See id. Most of the carrier's maintenance crews consist of "certified airframe
and powerplant (A & P) mechanics," who get paid quite a bit more than the
uncertified mechanics who make up most of the Part 145 repair stations' crews.
Id. The question is why is the FAA is letting uncertified mechanics perform this




307 See Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination,
supra note 288. Less than one in five of the smaller repair stations have safety
programs in place. See id.
784
DUAL MANDATE
grams in place. In addition, Crotty has found that the FAA has
problems with the number and quality of their inspectors, who
often do not have travel budgets large enough to allow them to
go into the field for inspections °.30  The FAA also does not re-
quire periodic retraining of mechanics the way it does for pilots
and flight attendants. 09
Part 145 of the Federal Aviation Regulations certifies third-
party repair facilities.3 10 In 1999, after criticism resulting from
the Valujet crash, the FAA proposed rewriting Part 145.11
While the rewrite is necessary to address new technology, "'a
serious flaw in the proposal is the fact that it totally ignores the
variety of scope and operations of the majority of the 4,509 FAA-
licensed repair stations, '' 3 12 according to the National Air
Transportation Association's (NATA) Vice President Andy
Cebula. Only seven percent of all repair stations fit the profile
of SabreTech, which was implicated in the Valujet crash.3" Yet,
the FAA rewrite would affect all stations with the same restric-
tions and regulations.
NATA also contends that the rewrite would extend FAA au-
thority into areas controlled by other government agencies.1
For example, the FAA intends to require inspectors to check
heating, ventilation, and lighting in maintenance facilities. This
typically falls under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA).15 In any case, it sounds as
if the FAA is at it again, addressing a problem too late, after the
tragedy has occurred, with too broad a scope to be effective.
V. EVERYBODY WINS
From this overview, it appears that the FAA has many
problems to address. While the agency has implemented pro-
grams to deal with some of these issues, management and ad-
308 See id.
309 See id. This really makes no sense. The person serving you a soda and pea-
nuts needs retraining, but not the guy responsible for making sure the plane
works despite constant changes and advances in aircraft technology?
310 See id.
311 See NATA Is Sharply Critical of FAA's Part 145 Proposal, WKLv. OF Bus. AViA-
TION, July 12, 1999, at 113. See also Reaction to the FAA's Proposed New Rule, AviA-
TION DmLY, Aug. 23, 1999, at 1; Edward Tripp, FAA Oversteps Authority With New
Part 145, NATA Says, AERO SAFETY & MAINT., Aug. 6, 1999, at 4.
312 NATA is Sharply Critical of FAA's Part 145 Proposal, supra note 311.
313 See id.
314 See Tripp, supra note 311.
315 See id.
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ministration problems continue to plague the efforts to fix past
mistakes. Valujet woke everyone up. The NTSB keeps them
awake. Now it is up to the FAA to get up and take action.
What could help? Giving the NTSB some sort of enforcement
power would certainly help. The FAA could no longer lose itself
in bureaucratic pileups, studies, and negotiations with another
agency, as true to its purpose as the NTSB is, involved. If the
FAA cannot recognize the problems, let the NTSB set the
agency's agenda - assign problem areas and priorities to be ad-
dressed, and then allow the FAA to investigate and enforce regu-
lations in these areas. The NTSB already knows where the
problems lie. Why force the FAA to do cumulative work figur-
ing out where the problems are when this has already been
proven to slow down the process?
Two major complaints about the FAA are the time it takes to
fix safety issues and the lack of qualified investigators to find and
enforce regulations in the field. Bypass these problems by using
the NTSB's analysis to jump to the root of the problems more
quickly. Use the personnel or funds for those personnel, who sit
around trying to figure out what the agency should do, to hire
and train investigators. Of course, general inspections still need
to be done to look for violations that do not fall into a breaking
news category, but, obviously, having both the responsibility for
general inspections and addressing new safety issues is too much
for the FAA to handle right now. Giving the NTSB part of the
responsibility, even temporarily, would release some of the pres-
sure on the FAA. If the agency could just get one program to
run efficiently and effectively, this would be a great accomplish-
ment and certainly a stepping-stone to getting the FAA back on
the right track. ATOS is a good plan to accommodate the
agency's current assets and resources, but it would be even bet-
ter if this sort of plan was unnecessary because there were
enough investigators to go around.
There are, of course, many arguments for leaving the NTSB
exactly the way it is. The main argument is to keep it free from
the corruption and skewed priorities that have overtaken the
FAA. This is an excellent concern. Putting the NTSB in charge
should only be a temporary solution at most, and probably
should not even be considered as a solution. Instead, the FAA
should be completely restructured. Congress needs to make a
law that will force the FAA to do its job-keeping the public safe
in planes. Effective leaders need to be installed in the positions
of power within the agency. A system of checks and balances
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needs to be setup-whether it is some element of the NTSB that
makes sure the FAA is taking action, a congressional sub-com-
mittee, a new agency that simply watches over the FAA, or the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General.
The FAA needs to look at its own priorities. Worrying about
the success of the aviation industry should no longer be a con-
sideration. The aviation industry is successful - a look at the
growth and even at the accident rate and predictions is strange
but true evidence of this success. The goal should be safety. Ad-
dressing chronic problems like runway incursions and de-icing,
making logical changes and restrictions for aircraft certification
and even employee certification, requiring adequate testing and
proof of an aircraft's capabilities, whether approving a new de-
sign or certifying a craft for flight in new conditions - are all
logical steps to improving aviation safety. The NTSB has identi-
fied all of these as problem areas. Now someone just needs to
take action.
In addition, while a program like Safer Skies is a step in the
right direction, the FAA needs to look at why the agency's other
programs are not effective. For example, delays in addressing
problems, poor training of inspectors, too few inspectors, poor
organization and implementation, reducing fines for violations
or not imposing fines at all are all examples of ineffective opera-
tions. 16 Delays are the major problem - it takes so long to get a
program into action that by the time it is implemented, the pro-
gram uses outdated technology or is incapable of handling the
situation. Perhaps this is why the FAA moved to implement
Safer Skies so quickly. Unfortunately, speed cannot make up for
poor organization or implementation. Speed will only com-
pound these problems. The FAA needs to address all of these
issues, and Congress needs to give it the means to do so with
funds, personnel, and support.
316 Fines need to be made so expensive that no company can afford to violate
regulations. Of course, then we end up with companies who figure they just can-
not afford to be caught violating these regulations. We need to come up with a
solution to this catch-22. The solution may be getting enough inspectors out
there so that no company has the chance to violate the regulations-though this
is entirely dependant on the FAA getting itself into shape. Maybe getting compa-
nies to watchdog each other and getting employees to keep an eye on their em-
ployer's policies would work. Although probably impractical, I personally think
that any company who is going to violate the hazmat regulations after all the
publicity about the dangers of these violations and the Valujet tragedy, should be
put out of business.
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Airlines also can get involved to improve safety - by comply-
ing with recommendations or airworthiness directives in a
timely manner, insuring adequate aircraft maintenance, and es-
tablishing programs ensuring both employee and customer sat-
isfaction. A great safety record is an excellent way to keep
customers happy and retain their patronage. The FAA can still
fulfill its historical purpose by altering the agency's actions to
focus on safety. Customers will be happy and eager to fly. And
everybody wins.
